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

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

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thought our way through a lot earlier as leaders," he asserts. "In too many instances, there were stand-alone data bases and stand-alone weapon systems."

The stunning success of Army aviation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is cited by Allard. Helicopters of the 1st Armored Division's 4th Brigade combined the critical advantages of speed and mobility in mountainous terrain. The use of video gun camera tape from Apache attack helicopters played an important role. Innovations by the helicopter crews led to a new method of digitizing imagery that provided valuable intelligence. When coupled with an approximately $900 commercial software frame grabber, resulting photographs documented Dayton Accord violations. As unclassified imagery, the photographs occasionally could be handed over to the former warring factions, he observes.

Information is the only component of warfare whose cost has gone down and whose utility has gone up. The Bosnia-Herzegovina experience underlines the need to substitute commercial telecommunications, automation and services for outmoded military equipment and support structures. Allard claims that the integration of the Russian brigade attached to IFOR largely was based on soldier-to-soldier relationships. In contrast, the largest single command and control problem handicapping coordination in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Dayton Accords, which did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political and humanitarian aspects of the mission.

Information technology is uniquely affected by people, training and procedures, and the time people take to perform them. However, a combination of these factors in combat or operational settings constantly and curiously is underestimated, according to Allard's assessment. The organizational implications of modern warfare are barely being addressed—synchronizing the political and military sides of a peacekeeping operation, reducing top-heavy headquarters and substituting commercial products for outmoded military equipment and redundant support structures, he reports.

These tasks are daunting. Without strong leadership commitments, hard-won progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina will fall short of the potential that information-age operations will demand on other fields and in other years, Allard concludes. *—CAR*

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